Discourse on Political Economy

[1]* *Economy* or *Oeconomie* (Moral and Political). This word comes from οιχος, *house,* and from νόμος, *law,* and originally meant only the wise and legitimate government of the house, for the common good of the whole family. The sense of this term has subsequently been extended to the government of the large family, which is the state. In order to distinguish these two meanings, one refers in the latter case to *general* or *political economy;* and in the former, to *domestic* or *private economy.* It is only the first which is the question in this article. On *domestic economy,* see FATHER OF THE FAMILY.

[2]* Even if there were as close an affinity between the state and the family as several authors claim, it would not thereby follow that the rules of conduct appropriate to one of these two societies would be appropriate to the other; they differ too much in size to be administered in the same manner, and there will always be an extreme difference between domestic government, where the father can see everything by himself, and civil government, where the chief sees almost nothing except through the eyes of others. For things to become equal in this regard, the talents,

*Asterisks (*) follow the numbers of all paragraphs for which explanatory comments are to be found, with regard either to the paragraphs themselves or passages within them; these comments are to be found in the "Notes" beginning on p.217.

strength, and all the faculties of the father would have to increase in proportion to the size of the family, and the soul of a powerful monarch would have to be in comparison to that of an ordinary man as the extent of his empire is to the inheritance of a private individual.

[3] But how could the government of the state be similar to that of the family, whose foundation is so different? The father is physically much stronger than his children, and for as long as his help is necessary, the paternal power is reasonably accepted as having been established by nature. In the large family whose members are all naturally equal, political authority, purely arbitrary as to its institution, can be founded only on conventions, and the magistrate can command others only by virtue of the laws. The duties of the father are dictated to him by natural sentiments and in a tone that rarely permits him to disobey. The chiefs do not have a similar rule, and they are really accountable only to the people for what they have promised to do, and which the people may rightfully require them to carry out. Another, even more important difference is that since children have only what they receive from the father, it is evident that all rights of ownership [proprietorship] belong to him or emanate from him; it is completely opposite in the large family, where the general administration is established only to assure the private ownership anterior to it. The principal object of the work of the whole household is to conserve and increase the patrimony of the father so that he can someday divide it among his children without leaving them impoverished; in contrast, the wealth of the public treasury is only a means, often badly understood, to maintain private individuals in peace and abundance. In a word, the little family is destined to disappear, and to dissolve someday into several other, similar families; but the large family having been created to always continue in the same state, it is necessary that the first enlarge itself in order to multiply: and not only does it suffice that the second conserve itself,

but one can easily prove that every enlargement is more prejudicial than useful to it.

[4] For several reasons taken from the nature of the thing, the father ought to command in the family. First, authority ought not be equal between the father and the mother; but it is necessary that the government should be one, and that in the division of opinion, one predominant voice decide. Second, however lightly one wishes to suppose the particular indispositions of the wife; as they always necessitate intervals of inaction for her, this is a sufficient reason to exclude her from this primacy: for when the balance is perfectly equal, one straw suffices to tip it. Additionally, the husband should watch the conduct of his wife; because it is important for him to assure himself that the children whom he must recognize and sustain do not belong to anyone but himself. The wife, who does not have to fear anything similar, does not have the same right over the husband. Third, the children should obey the father, at first out of necessity, later out of gratitude; after having received fulfillment of their own needs during one half of their lives, they ought to consecrate the other half to providing for his. Fourth, regarding servants, they also owe him their services in exchange for the livelihood he gives them, unless they break the agreement when it ceases to suit them. I do not speak of slavery; because it is contrary to nature, and no right can authorize it.

[5] There is nothing of all this in political society. Far from the chief having a natural interest in the happiness of the private individuals, it is not unusual for him to seek his own in their misery. If the magistracy is hereditary, it is often a child who commands men; if it is elective, a thousand inconveniences are found in the elections, and one loses in either case all the advantages of paternity. If you have only one chief, you are at the discretion of a master who has no reason to love you; if you have several, it is necessary to bear at the same time their tyranny and their dissensions. In a

word, abuses are inevitable with dire consequences in every society, where the public interest and the laws lack natural force, and are unceasingly attacked by the personal interest and passions of the chief and the members.

[6] Although the functions of the father of the family and of the first magistrate ought to tend to the same goal, it is by such different routes; their duty and their rights are so distinct that it is not possible to confound them without forming false ideas about the fundamental laws of society and without falling into errors fatal to mankind. Indeed, if the voice of nature is the best counsel to which a good father ought to listen in order to fulfill his duties well, for the magistrate it is only a false guide which unceasingly works to separate him from his duties, and which sooner or later brings both his downfall and that of the state, if he is not restrained by the most sublime virtue. The sole precaution necessary for the father of the family is to protect himself against depravity, and to prevent his natural inclinations from becoming corrupted; but these are just what corrupts the magistrate. To do well, the father has only to consult his heart; the magistrate becomes a traitor the moment he listens to his own: his reason itself should be suspect, and he ought to follow no other rule than that of public reason, which is the law. Also, nature has made a multitude of good fathers of families: but it is doubtful whether, since the beginning of the world, human wisdom has ever made ten men capable of governing their fellows.

[7]* From all I have shown, it follows that it is with reason that one distinguishes *public economy* from *private economy,* and that the state having nothing in common with the family other than the obligation the chiefs have to render each of them happy, the same rules of conduct could not apply to the two.[1] I thought that these few lines would suffice to

1. In the 1782 edition, the last clause was changed to read: "neither could their rights come from the same source, nor could the same rules of conduct apply to the two."—ED.

destroy the odious system that Sir [Robert] Filmer tried to establish in the work entitled *Patriarcha,* to which two illustrious men have paid too much honor by writing books to refute it: nevertheless, this error is very ancient, since Aristotle himself judged it appropriate to challenge it with reasons which can be seen in the first book of his *Politics.*

[8]* I request my readers to distinguish clearly *political economy,* which is my topic, and which I call *government,* from the supreme authority which I call *sovereignty;* a distinction which consists in that the one has the legislative right, and in certain cases obligates the body of the nation itself, while the other has only the executive power, and is only able to obligate private individuals. See POLITICS and SOVEREIGNTY.

[9] Permit me to employ for a moment a comparison that is common and in many ways inexact, but appropriate to make myself better understood.

[10]* The body politic, taken individually, can be considered as a body, organized, living, and similar to that of a man. The sovereign power represents the head; the laws and customs are the brain, source of the nerves and seat of the understanding, the will, and the senses, of which the judges and magistrates are the organs; commerce, industry, and agriculture are the mouth and stomach, which prepare the common subsistence; public finances are the blood that a wise *economy,* in performing the functions of the heart, sends out to distribute nourishment and life throughout the body; the citizens are the body and the members who make the mechanism move, live, and work, and cannot be injured in any part without a painful impression being carried to the brain, if the animal is in a state of health.

[11] The life of each relating part is the *self* common to the whole, the reciprocal sensibility and internal relation of all the parts. What if this communication should cease, the formal unity evaporate, and the contiguous parts belong to each other only by juxtaposition? The man is dead, or the state is dissolved.

[12]* The body politic is then also a moral being which has a will; and this general will, which always tends to the conservation and the well-being of the whole and of each part, and which is the source of the laws, is for all the members of the state, by virtue of the relation to them and to it, the rule of what is just and unjust; this truth, let it be said in passing, shows with how little sense so many writers have treated as thievery the cunning prescribed to the children of Sparta to gain their frugal meal, as if everything the law orders could fail to be legitimate. See the word RIGHT, the source of this great and luminous principle, of which this article is the development.

[13] It is important to remark that this rule of justice, dependable in relation to all citizens, can be defective with regard to foreigners; and the reason for this is evident: then the will of the state, although general in relation to its members, is no longer so in relation to other states and their members, but becomes for them a private and individual will, which has its rule of justice in the law of nature, and is included in the principle established: for then the large city of the world becomes the body politic, of which the law of nature is always the general will, and of which the diverse states and peoples are only the individual members.

[14]* From these same distinctions, applied to each political society and to its members, flow the most universal and dependable rules by which one can judge of a good or bad government, and, in general, the morality of all human actions.

[15]* Every political society is composed of other, smaller societies of different kinds, each of which has its interests and its maxims; but these societies, which everyone notices because they have an external and authorized form, are not the only ones which really exist in the state; all private individuals united by a common interest comprise as many others, permanent or transient, whose force is no less real for being less apparent, and a careful observation of their diverse relationships comprises the true knowledge of customary con-

duct. It is all these tacit or formal associations which so modify the manifestations of the public will by their influence. The will of these private societies always has two relations: for the members of the association, it is a general will; for the larger society, it is a private will which is very often upright in the first regard and vicious in the second. One can be a devout priest, or brave soldier, or active practitioner of his calling, and a bad citizen. A particular decision can be advantageous to the small community and very pernicious to the large one. It is true that since private societies are always subordinate to those which contain them, one ought to obey the large one in preference to the others, for the duties of the citizen come before those of a senator, and those of a man before those of the citizen: but unfortunately, personal interest is always found in inverse proportion to that of duty, and increases as the association becomes narrower and the engagement less sacred; invincible proof that the most general will is always the most just, and that the voice of the people is indeed the voice of God.

[16]* It does not thereby follow that public decisions are always equitable; they may not be so concerning foreign affairs; I have stated the reason. Thus it is not impossible that a well-governed republic wage an unjust war. It is also not impossible that the council of a democracy pass bad decrees and condemn the innocent; but it will only happen when the people are seduced by private interests, when some clever men, by their influence and their eloquence, will succeed in substituting their own private interests for the interests of the people. Then the public decision will be one thing and the general will another. Do not cite the democracy of Athens as a counter example, because Athens was hardly a democracy, but a very tyrannical aristocracy governed by learned men and orators. Examine with care what happens in any resolution and you will see that the general will is always for the common good; but very often a secret division, a tacit confederation, occurs which eludes the natural disposition of the assembly in favor of their own private

views. Then the social body is really divided into other bodies, whose members choose a general will, good and just with regard to these new bodies, unjust and bad regarding the whole from which each of them has broken away.

[17]* One sees with what ease one explains by the aid of these principles the apparent contradictions noticed in the conduct of many men full of scruple and honor in some regards, deceptive and knavish in others, trampling under foot the most sacred duties, and loyal to the death to engagements that are often illegitimate. It is thus that the most corrupt men always render some kind of homage to the public faith; it is thus (as remarked in the article RIGHT) that the same brigands who are the enemies of virtue in the large society worship its likeness in their caverns.

[18] In establishing the general will as the first principle of public *economy* and the fundamental rule of government, I have not believed it necessary to ask seriously whether the magistrates belong to the people or the people to the magistrates, and whether in public affairs one should consult the good of the state or that of the chiefs. For a long time this question has been decided in one manner by practice and in another by reason; in general it would be great folly to hope that those who are in fact masters will prefer another interest to their own. It would then also be proper to divide public *economy* into the popular and the tyrannical. The first is that of every state, where a unity of interest and will between the people and the chiefs governs; the other necessarily exists wherever the government and the people have different interests and consequently opposed wills. The maxims of the latter are written in the archives of history and in the satires of Machiavelli. The others are to be found only in the writings of philosophers who dare to demand the rights of humanity.

I

[19]* The first and most important maxim of legitimate or popular government, that is to say the one which has for its object the good of the people, is therefore, as I have said, to follow the general will in all matters; but in order to follow the general will it is necessary to know it, and above all to distinguish it well from the private will, beginning with oneself; this distinction is always difficult to make, and for making it only the most sublime virtue can provide sufficient enlightenment. Since it is necessary to be free in order to will, another, hardly lesser difficulty is to assure at the same time public liberty and the authority of the government. Seek the motives which have carried men, united by their mutual needs in the large society, to unite themselves more closely into civil societies; you will find no other than that of assuring the goods, the life, and the liberty of each member by the protection of all: now how can men be forced to defend the liberty of one among them without impairing the liberty of others? and how provide for public needs without disturbing the private ownership of those who are compelled to contribute to them? By whatever sophisms one is able to color all this, it is certain that if one is able to constrain my will, I am no longer free, and I am no longer the master of my goods if someone else can touch them. This difficulty, which must have seemed insurmountable, has been removed together with the first difficulty by the most sublime of all human institutions, or rather by a celestial inspiration which taught men to imitate here below the immutable decrees of the deity. By what inconceivable art were the means found to subject men in order to make them free? to employ in the service of the state the goods, the labor, and even the life of all its members without constraining and consulting them? to bind their will with their own approval? to let their consent prevail despite their refusal, and to force them to punish themselves when they do

what they have not willed to do? How can it be that they obey and no one commands, that they serve without having a master; so much freer indeed as under a seeming subjection, none losing any of his liberty except what may be harmful to the liberty of another? These marvels are the work of law. It is to law alone that men owe justice and liberty. It is this salutary organ of the will of all that restores in right the natural equality among men. It is this celestial voice that proclaims to each citizen the precepts of public reason, and teaches him to act according to the maxims of his own judgment, and not to be in contradiction with himself. It alone is what the chiefs should cause to speak when they command; for as soon as a man claims to subject another to his private will independent of the laws, he instantly leaves the civil state and places himself vis-à-vis the other in the pure state of nature, where obedience is never prescribed except by necessity.

[20]* The most pressing interest of the chief, even his most indispensable duty, is to watch over the observation of the laws of which he is the minister and on which all his authority is founded. If he must make others observe them, so much stronger is the reason to observe them himself, as he enjoys all of their benefit. For his example is of such force that, even if the people would permit him to free himself from the yoke of the law, he should forbear taking advantage of such a dangerous prerogative, which others would soon strive to usurp in turn and often to its detriment. In the main, as all the engagements of society are reciprocal by their nature, it is not possible to place oneself above the law without renouncing its advantages, and no one owes anything to anyone who claims he has no duty to anyone. For the same reason, no exemption from the law will ever be accorded for whatever claim in a well-administered government. Even those citizens who have most deserved recognition from the fatherland ought to be rewarded with honors and never with privileges: for the republic is at the verge of

its ruin as soon as anyone can think it fair not to obey the laws. But if ever the nobility or the military or any other order of the state should adopt such a maxim, all would be irredeemably lost.

[21] The power of the laws depends much more on their own wisdom than on the severity of their ministers, and the public will draws its greatest weight from the reason that dictated it: this is why Plato regards it as a very important precaution to always place at the head of edicts a reasoned preamble which shows their justice and utility. Indeed, the first of the laws is to respect the laws: the severity of punishments is only a vain expedient invented by little minds in order to substitute terror for the respect they are unable to obtain. One has always noted that the countries where corporal punishments are the most terrible are also those where they are most frequent; so that the cruelty of penalties only indicates the multitude of lawbreakers; punishing everything with equal severity forces the guilty to commit crimes in order to escape punishment for their mistakes.

[22] But although the government is not the master of the law, it is no small thing for it to be its guarantor and to have a thousand ways for making the law loved. The talent of reigning consists only in this. When one has force at hand, there is no art to make everyone tremble, and not much is needed to win their hearts; for long experience has taught the people to be grateful to its chiefs for all the evil they have not done to it, and to adore its chiefs when it is not hated by them. An imbecile who is obeyed is as able as anyone to punish crimes; the true statesman knows how to prevent them; it is over wills more than actions that he extends his respectable dominance. If he could make sure that everyone acted correctly, he himself would no longer have anything to do and the consummation of his works would be that he could remain idle. It is at least certain that the greatest talent of chiefs is to disguise their power in order to render it less odious, and to conduct the state

so peaceably that it seems to have no need of conductors.

[23]* I conclude then that, as the first duty of the legislator is to conform the laws to the general will, the first rule of public *economy* is that the administration should conform to the laws. This will be enough for the state not to be badly governed, if the legislator has seen, as he ought to have done, to everything required by the locality, the climate, soil, moral customs, neighborhood, and all the particular relationships of the people he was to institute. Still there remains an infinity of details, of policy and *economy,* left to the wisdom of the government; but there are always two infallible rules for conducting oneself correctly in these situations: the one is the spirit of the law, which ought to serve in deciding cases that could not have been anticipated; the other is the general will, the source and supplement of all the laws, which should always be consulted when they are lacking. How, I will be asked, can the general will be known in those cases in which it has never explained itself? Will it be necessary to assemble the entire nation at every unforeseen event? It will be less than necessary to assemble it, since it is not certain that its decision would be the expression of the general will; this method is impracticable for a large people, and it is rarely necessary when the government is well-intentioned; for the chiefs know well enough that the general will is always for the party that is most favorable to the public interest, that is to say the most equitable; thus it is only required to be just in order to be assured that the general will is followed. Often, when it is too openly flouted, it shows itself despite the terrible curb of public authority. I look as close by as I can for examples to follow in such a case. In China, the prince's constant maxim is to assign the blame to his officers in all disputes that arise between them and the people. Is bread expensive in a province? the commissioner is placed in prison; is there a riot in another? the governor is dismissed and each mandarin answers with his head for any evil that arises in his department.

It is not that the affair is not later examined in a regular manner: but long experience has made it possible to anticipate the verdict. There is seldom any injustice to be repaired; and the emperor, persuaded that public clamor never arises without reason, always discerns, among the seditious clamors he punishes, just grievances that he redresses.

[24] It is a great deal to have made order and peace reign in all parts of the republic; it is a great deal that the state should be tranquil and the law respected; but if one does nothing more, it will all be more appearance than reality, and the government will find it difficult to be obeyed if it limits itself to obedience. If it is good to know how to employ men as they are, it is still better to make them such as one needs them to be. The most absolute authority is that which penetrates to the interior of the man and exerts itself no less on his will than on his actions. It is certain that the peoples in the long run are what the government makes them to be. Warriors, citizens, men, when that is what it wants; mob and rabble when it pleases: every prince who scorns his subjects dishonors himself by showing that he does not know how to make them worthy of esteem. Form men then if you would command men: if you would have the laws obeyed, make them loved; and in order for one to do what one ought, let it suffice that one realize one ought to do it. This was the great art of ancient governments, in those remote times when philosophers gave laws to peoples, and employed their authority only to make them wise and happy. From this came so many sumptuary laws, so many regulations regarding moral customs, and so many public maxims which were accepted or rejected with the greatest care. The tyrants themselves did not forget this important part of administration, and were as careful to corrupt the conduct of their slaves as the magistrates were to correct the conduct of their fellow citizens. But our modern governments which believe that they have done everything when

they have collected money do not even imagine that it should be necessary or possible to reach that point.

II

[25]* The second essential rule of public *economy* is no less important than the first. Do you wish that the general will be fulfilled? cause all private wills to relate themselves to it; and as virtue is only this conformity of the private will to the general will, to say the same thing in a word, see to it that virtue reigns.

[26] If the political men were less blinded by their ambition, they would see how it is impossible for any establishment, whatever it be, to proceed in accord with the spirit of its institution if it is not directed in accord with the law of duty; they would realize that the greatest resource of public authority is in the heart of the citizens, and that nothing can replace good customs for the maintenance of the government. Not only do good people alone know how to administer the laws but, fundamentally, honest men alone know how to obey them. He who succeeds in braving remorse will not delay in braving corporal punishment; it is less severe, less continuous, and something from which he has at least the hope of escaping; whatever precautions are taken, those who look forward only to not being punished for doing wrong hardly lack a means to elude the law or escape punishment. Then, as all private interests unite against the general interest, which is no longer that of any individual, public vices have more force to debilitate the laws than the laws have to repress the vices; the corruption of the people and the chiefs finally extends to the government, however wise it may be: the worst of all abuses is to obey the laws in appearance in order safely to violate them in deed. Soon the best laws become the most disastrous; it would be a hundred times better if they did not exist; this would still be a resource when nothing else remained. In

such a situation one uselessly adds edicts on edicts, regulations on regulations. All that serves only to introduce other abuses without correcting the first ones. The more you multiply laws, the more you render them despicable: and all the inspectors you appoint are only new lawbreakers destined to share with the old ones, or to do their pillage separately. Soon the price of virtue becomes that of brigandage: the vilest men are the most accredited; the greater they are, the more contemptible they become; their infamy glares in their high dignity, and they are dishonored by their honors. If they buy the approbation of the chiefs or the protection of women, it is in order to sell in turn justice, duty, and the state; and the people, who does not see that its vices are the first cause of its misfortunes, murmurs and cries, lamenting: "All my miseries come only from those whom I pay to protect me."

[27] It is then that the chiefs are forced to substitute for the voice of duty, which no longer speaks in the hearts, the cry of terror or the lure of an apparent interest with which they deceive their creatures. It is then that it is necessary to resort to all those petty and contemptible ruses which they call *maxims of state* and *secrets of the cabinet.* All the vigor left to the government is employed by its members to destroy and supplant one another, while the public business remains abandoned, or is pursued only to the extent that personal interest demands and directs them. Finally, the entire skill of these great political men is to fascinate the eyes of those whom they need, so much that each believes himself to work for his own interest while working for *theirs;* I say theirs, if indeed it is the true interest of chiefs to annihilate peoples in order to subject them and even to ruin them in order to assure themselves of possessing them.[2]

2. The last clause reads: *"je dis le leur, si tant est qu'en effet le véritable intérêt des chefs soit d'anéantir les peuples pour les soûmettre, et de ruiner leur propre bien pour s'en assûrer la possession."*—ED.

[28] But when the citizens love their duty, and those in whom public authority is entrusted sincerely apply themselves to nourish this love by their example and by their solicitude, all difficulties evaporate, and the administration takes on an ease which dispenses with that shadowy art whose sinister shade provides its mysterious attraction. Those vast spirits, so dangerous and so admired, all those great ministers whose glory is only its fusion with the misfortunes of the people, are no longer missed; public customs supersede the talents of the chiefs; and the more virtue reigns, the less are such talents necessary. Ambition itself is better served by duty than by usurpation; the people, convinced that its chiefs work only for its happiness, saves them by its deference from working to consolidate their power; and history shows us in a thousand places that the authority accorded to those whom it loves and by whom it is loved is a hundred times more absolute than all the tyranny of usurpers. This does not mean that the government should fear to use its power, but that it should only be used in a legitimate manner. One finds in history a thousand examples of ambitious or pusillanimous chiefs who have been undone by weakness or pride, but not one who fared badly by being only equitable. But one should confuse neither negligence with moderation, nor kindness with weakness. It is necessary to be severe in order to be just: to suffer the wickedness one has the right and the power to repress is to be wicked oneself.[3]

[29]* It is not enough to say to the citizens, be good; it is necessary to teach them how to be so; and example itself, which in this regard is the first lesson, is not the sole means that must be employed: love of the fatherland is the most

3. In the 1782 edition, the paragraph is completed by a quotation from Saint Augustine: *"Sicuti enim est aliquando misericordia puniens, ita est crudelitas parcens"* (*Letters,* 54). [In the same way that pity can sometimes punish, cruelty can pardon.]—ED.

efficacious; for as I have already said, every man is virtuous when his private will conforms in everything to the general will, and we readily want what is wanted by the people we love.

[30] It would seem that the sentiment of humanity evaporates and weakens when diffused over the whole earth, and that we could not be as touched by the calamities of Tartary or Japan as by those of a European people. Interest and commiseration must in some way be confined and compressed in order to be actuated. Now since this tendency in us can be useful only to those with whom we have to live, it is well that humane sentiments be concentrated among fellow citizens, that it take from them a new force through the habit of seeing each other and through the common interest that unites them. It is certain that the greatest wonders of virtue have been produced by love of the fatherland: this sweet and lively sentiment, which joins the force of pride[4] to the complete beauty of virtue, gives virtue an energy that, without disfiguring it, makes it the most heroic of all passions. It is what produced so many immortal actions whose brilliance dazzles our weak eyes, so many great men whose ancient virtues are taken as fables ever since patriotism has become an object of derision. This should not surprise us; the ecstasies of tender hearts appear fanciful to anyone who has not felt them; and the love of the fatherland, a hundred times more lively and delicious than that of a mistress, can also be conceived only by experiencing it: but it is easy to notice in all hearts it inflames, in all actions it inspires, this boiling and sublime ardor, which even the purest virtue does not show when separated from it. Let us dare to compare even Socrates to Cato: the one was more the philosopher, the other more the citizen. Athens was already lost, and Socrates no longer had any fatherland other than the entire world; Cato always carried his own

4. Rousseau's word is *l'amour propre.*—ED.

within his heart; he lived only for it and could not survive it. The virtue of Socrates is that of the wisest of men: but between Caesar and Pompey, Cato seems a god among mortals. The one instructs some individuals, contends against the Sophists, and dies for truth: the other defends the state, liberty, the laws, against conquerors of the world, and finally quits the earth when he no longer sees in it a fatherland to serve. A worthy student of Socrates would be the most virtuous of his contemporaries; a worthy emulator of Cato would be the greatest of them. The virtue of the first would constitute his happiness, the second would seek his in that of all. We would be instructed by one and led by the other, and that alone should decide the preference: for one has never made a people of sages, but it is not impossible to render a people happy.

[31] Do we wish peoples to be virtuous? let us begin then by making them love the fatherland: but how could they love it, if it is nothing more for them than for foreigners, and only accords them what it cannot refuse to anyone? It would be much worse if they did not even enjoy civil security, and if their goods, their life, or their liberty were placed at the discretion of powerful men, without it being possible or permitted for them to dare to invoke the laws. Then, subjected to the obligations of the civil state, without even enjoying the rights of the state of nature and without being able to employ their own strength to defend themselves, they consequently would be in the worst condition in which free men can find themselves, and the word *fatherland* could have for them only an odious or a ridiculous meaning. It should not be thought that the arm can be hurt or cut off without the pain being conveyed to the head; and it is no more credible that the general will allow a member of the state, whoever he may be, to wound or destroy another than it is to believe that the fingers of a man in full use of his reason would put out his own eyes. Personal security is so closely bound up with the public confederation that were it

not for what one should allow to human weakness, this convention would be dissolved by right, if a single citizen in the state perished who could have been saved, if a single person was wrongfully held in prison, and if one lost a single lawsuit with evident injustice: for the fundamental conventions being broken, one can no longer see what right or interest could maintain the people in the social union, unless it is retained by force alone, which itself dissolves the civil state.

[32]* Indeed, is it not the commitment of the body of the nation to provide for the conservation of the least of its members with as much care as for all the rest? and is the safety of a citizen no less the common cause than is the safety of the whole state? If we are told that it is good that a single individual perish for all, I will admire this pronouncement in the mouth of a worthy and virtuous patriot who voluntarily consecrates himself out of duty to die for the safety of his country: but if one understands this to mean that the government be permitted to sacrifice an innocent man for the safety of the multitude, I hold this maxim to be one of the most execrable that tyranny ever invented, the most spurious that could be advanced, the most dangerous one can allow, and the most directly opposed to the fundamental laws of society. Far from any individual being obligated to perish for all, all have engaged their goods and their lives for the defense of each of them, to the end that individual weakness always be protected by the public force, and each member by the whole state. After having by supposition cut off one individual after another from the people, press the partisans of this maxim to better explain what they understand by *the body of the state,* and you will see that they will reduce it in the end to a small number of men who are not the people but the officers of the people, who, having obligated themselves by a personal oath to perish for its safety, pretend to prove in this way that it is for them that the people should perish.

[33] Does one wish to find examples of the protection the

state owes its members and the respect it owes to their persons? it is only among the most illustrious and courageous nations of the earth that it is necessary to look, and only among free peoples is the worth of a man known. It is known in what perplexity the whole republic of Sparta found itself when it was a question of punishing a guilty citizen. In Macedonia, the life of a man was such an important affair that despite all the grandeur of Alexander, this powerful monarch would not have dared to kill a Macedonian criminal in cold blood, unless the accused had first appeared to defend himself before his fellow citizens and had been condemned by them. But the Romans distinguished themselves above all peoples of the earth by the regard of the government for the individual and by its scrupulous attention to respecting the inviolable rights of all members of the state. There was nothing so sacred as the life of simple citizens; nothing less than the assembly of the whole people was necessary to condemn one of them: neither the senate itself nor the consuls, in all their majesty, had this right; among the most powerful people of the world the crime and punishment of one citizen was a public desolation; and it seemed so harsh to shed blood for any crime that by the law of *Porcia* the death penalty was commuted to that of exile for all who would be willing to survive the loss of such a sweet fatherland. Everyone in Rome and in the armies breathed this love of fellow citizens for one another, and this respect for the name Roman, which raised the courage and animated the virtue of whoever had the honor to bear it. The hat of a citizen delivered from slavery, the civic crown of one who had saved the life of another, were regarded with the most pleasure in celebrations of triumphs; and it has been remarked that of the crowns by which great actions in war were honored, it was only the civic crown and those of the victors that were made of herbs and leaves; all the others were only of gold. It is thus that Rome was virtuous and became the mistress of the world. Ambitious

chiefs! A herdsman governs his dogs and his flocks and is only the least of men. If it is a good thing to command, it is when those who obey us can do us honor; respect then your fellow citizens, and you will render yourselves worthy of respect; respect liberty and your power will increase every day; never pass the limits of your rights, and soon they will be without limits.

[34]* Let the fatherland then show itself to be the common mother of the citizens, let the advantages they enjoy in their country endear it to them, let the government leave them enough part in the public administration so that they feel they are at home, and let the laws be in their eyes only the guarantors of the common liberty. These rights, beautiful as they are, belong to all men; but without appearing to attack them directly, the bad will of chiefs easily reduces their effect to nothing. The law which is abused serves the powerful at the same time as an offensive weapon and as a shield against the weak, and the pretext of the public good is always the most dangerous scourge of the people. What is most necessary, and perhaps the most difficult in government, is a rigorous integrity to render justice to all, and especially to protect the poor against the tyranny of the rich. The greatest evil already has been done, when one has poor people to defend and the rich to hold in. It is only on those of moderate means that the full force of the laws is exerted; they are equally impotent against the treasures of the rich and the misery of the poor; the first eludes them, the second escapes them; the one breaks the net, the other passes through.

[35] It is then one of the most important concerns of government to prevent the extreme inequality of fortunes, not by taking treasures away from their possessors, but by removing from everyone the means of accumulating them; not by building almshouses for the poor, but by shielding citizens from becoming poor. Men unequally distributed on the territory, and crowded together in one place while other

places are being depopulated; favoring the arts of pleasure and those that are purely mechanical at the expense of useful and laborious trades; the sacrifice of agriculture to commerce; the revenue officer made necessary by the poor administration of the state's money; finally, venality pushed to such excess that respect is measured with coins, and the virtues themselves are sold at the cost of silver: such are the most obvious causes of opulence and misery, of the substitution of private for public interest, of the mutual hatred of the citizens, of their indifference to the common cause, of the corruption of the people and the weakening of all springs of government. Such are consequently the ills that are difficult to remedy when they make themselves felt, but that a wise administration should prevent in order to maintain good customs along with respect for the laws, love of the fatherland, and the vigor of the general will.

[36]* But all these precautions will be insufficient, if one does not take the matter much further. I conclude this part of the public *economy* where I should have begun it. The fatherland is not able to live without liberty, nor liberty without virtue, nor virtue without citizens: you will have all this if you create citizens; without them you will have only wicked slaves, beginning with the chiefs of the state. But to form citizens is not the affair of a day, and to have them as men one has to instruct them as children. I will be told that whoever has men to govern should not seek beyond their nature a perfection of which they are not susceptible; that he should not wish to destroy the passions in them, and that fulfilling such a project would be no more desirable than possible. I would agree all the more readily with that, for a man who had no passions would certainly be a bad citizen; but it must also be agreed that if one cannot teach men to love nothing, it is not impossible for them to learn to love one object more than another, and what is truly beautiful rather than what is deformed. If, for example, they are trained early enough never to regard their individual per-

son except by its relations to the body of the State, and not to perceive their own existence, so to speak, except as a part of its existence, they will finally be able to come to identify themselves in some way with this greater whole, to feel themselves members of the fatherland, to love it with that exquisite sentiment that every isolated man has only for himself, to elevate their souls perpetually to this great object, and to thus transform into a sublime virtue this dangerous disposition from which all our vices are born. Not only does Philosophy demonstrate the possibility of these new directions, but History furnishes a thousand brilliant examples of it: if they are so rare among us, it is because no one cares whether there are citizens, and one considers still less trying to form them early in life. It is too late to change our natural inclinations when they are set in their course and habit has joined them to pride;[5] it is too late to draw us out of ourselves, when once the *human self* concentrated in our hearts has there acquired this contemptible activity that absorbs all virtue and constitutes the life of petty souls. How could the love of the fatherland germinate in the midst of so many other passions that stifle it? and what remains for fellow citizens of a heart already divided among avarice, a mistress, and vanity?

[37]* It is from the first moment of life that one has to learn to deserve to live; and as one participates, on being born, in the rights of citizens, the instant of our birth should be the beginning of the exercise of our duties. If there are laws for maturity, there should be laws for infancy, which teach obedience to others; and as one does not allow each man's reason to be the unique arbiter of his duties, one should even less abandon to the insights and prejudices of fathers the education of their children, as it matters even more to the state than to the fathers; for according to the course of nature, the death of the father often deprives him

5. Rousseau's word is *l'amour propre.*—ED.

of the last fruits of this education, but the fatherland sooner or later feels its effects; the state abides and the family dissolves. Should the public authority take the place of the fathers, it acquires their rights in fulfilling their duties; the fathers then have less cause for complaint, as in this respect they have only changed names, and they will have in common, under the name of citizens, the same authority over their children that they separately exercised under the name of *fathers,* and they will be no less obeyed when speaking in the name of the law than they were when speaking in the name of nature. Public education under rules prescribed by the government, and under magistrates established by the sovereign, is therefore one of the fundamental maxims of popular or legitimate government. If children are raised in common in the bosom of equality, if they are imbued with the laws of the state and the maxims of the general will, if they are taught to respect them above all things, if they are surrounded by examples and by objects which constantly speak to them of the tender mother who nourishes them, of the love she has for them, of the inestimable benefits they receive from her and of what they owe in return, it cannot be doubted that they will learn to cherish each other as brothers, always to want what society wants, to substitute actions of men and citizens for the vain and sterile babble of sophists, and to become one day the defenders and the fathers of the fatherland of which they will have been the children for so long.

[38] I will not speak of the magistrates destined to preside over this education, which is certainly the most important business of the state. One knows that if such marks of public confidence were lightly accorded, if this sublime function were not, for those who had worthily fulfilled all the others, the reward of their labors, the honorable and sweet repose of their old age, and the summit of all honors, the entire enterprise would be useless and the education without success; for wherever the lesson is not sustained by authority,

and precept by example, instruction remains without fruit, and virtue itself loses its credit in the mouth of those who do not practice it. But let illustrious warriors bent under the weight of their laurels preach courage; let honest magistrates grown white in dignity on their tribunals teach justice; they will each thus develop virtuous successors and transmit from age to age, unto succeeding generations, the experience and the talents of chiefs, the courage and virtue of citizens, and the emulation common to all to live and to die for the fatherland.

[39] I know of only three people who in former times practiced public education: namely, the Cretans, the Lacedaemonians [Spartans], and the ancient Persians; among all three it was a great success, and did wonders among the last two. When the world found itself divided into nations too large to be well governed, this way was no longer practicable; and other reasons which the reader can readily see have still prevented it from being tried among any modern people. It is very remarkable that the Romans were able to do without it; but Rome was for five hundred years a continual miracle, which the world should not hope to see again. The virtue of the Romans, engendered by the horror of tyranny and the crimes of tyrants, and by the innate love of the fatherland, made all their homes into as many schools for citizens; and the unlimited power of fathers over their children placed such severity in the private realm that the father in his domestic tribunal was feared more than the magistrates as the censor of moral conduct and the avenger of the laws.

[40] It is thus that a government attentive and well-intentioned, ceaselessly vigilant to maintain or recall among the people the love of the fatherland and good moral customs, prevents from afar evils which sooner or later result from the indifference of the citizens for the fate of the republic, and contains within narrow limits that personal interest which so isolates individuals that the state is weakened by

their power and is unable to expect anything from their good will. Wherever the people loves its country, respects the laws, and lives simply, little remains to be done in order to render it happy; and in public administration, where fortune plays less of a role than it does in the fate of private individuals, wisdom is so close to happiness that the two objects are fused in each other.

III

[41]* It is not enough to have citizens and to protect them; it is also necessary to think of their subsistence; and to provide for public needs is an evident consequence of the general will, and the third essential duty of government. This duty is not, one ought to realize, to replenish the granaries of private individuals and exempt them from work, but to maintain abundance so within their reach that to acquire it, work should always be necessary and never useless. It extends to all the operations regarding the care of the public treasury and the expenses of the public administration. Thus, having spoken of the general *economy* in relation to the government of persons, it remains for us to consider it in relation to the administration of goods.

[42]* This part offers no fewer difficulties to resolve, or contradictions to remove, than the preceding one. It is certain that the right of property ownership[6] is the most sacred of all the rights of citizens, and more important in certain respects than liberty itself; either because it lies closer to the conservation of life; or because goods are more easily usurped and more difficult to defend than the person, and one ought to respect more what can be carried off more

6. Rousseau's phrase is *le droit de propriété;* insofar as the focus of this last word, from which the English "proprietor(ship)" derives, seems to be less on goods as such, *les biens,* than on the person who controls their use, the word "ownership" has generally been used for it in this essay. —ED.

easily; or finally because ownership is the true foundation of civil society and the true guarantee of the commitments of the citizens: for if goods were not answerable for persons, nothing would be so easy as to elude one's duties and to mock the laws. On the other side, it is no less certain that the maintenance of the state and the government requires costs and outlays; and as whoever accepts the end cannot refuse the means, it follows that the members of the society ought to contribute from their goods to its upkeep. Further, it is difficult to secure the property of individuals on the one hand without attacking it on the other, and it is not possible that all the rules regarding inheritance, testaments, contracts, not constrain citizens in certain ways concerning the disposition of their own goods, and consequently their right of ownership.

[43] Beyond what I have already said about the agreement which reigns between the authority of the law and the liberty of the citizen, there is an important remark to make concerning the disposition of goods that removes many of the difficulties. It is, as Puffendorf has shown, that by its nature, the right of ownership does not extend beyond the life of the proprietor, and that at the instant a man has died, his goods no longer belong to him. Thus, to prescribe to him the conditions under which he may dispose of them is at bottom less to alter his right in appearance than to extend it in fact.

[44] In general, although the institution of laws which govern the power of individuals in the disposition of their goods belongs only to the sovereign, the spirit of these laws, which the government should follow in their application, is that from father to son and from kin to kin, the family goods leaving and being alienated as little as possible. There is a sensible reason for this, in favor of the children, to whom the right of ownership would be truly useless if the father left them nothing, and who, having contributed often by their labor to the acquisition of the father's goods, are in

their own name associated with his right. But another reason, more distant and not less important, is that nothing is more fatal to habitual conduct and to the republic than continual changes of station and fortune among the citizens; such changes are the proof and source of a thousand disorders which upset and confound everything, and by which those who are raised for one thing find themselves destined for another—neither those who rise nor those who fall are able to take up the maxims or enlightenment suitable for their new status, and much less to fulfill its duties. I pass to the question of public finances.

[45] If the people governed itself, with no intermediary between the administration of the state and the citizens, they would only have to assess themselves as occasion arose in proportion to public needs and the capacities of private individuals; and as each would never lose sight of either the collection or the use of these funds, neither fraud nor abuse could slip into their management: the state would never be encumbered by debt nor the people crushed by taxes, or at least the certainty of proper use would console it for the burden of taxes. But things could not go this way; however limited the state may be, civil society is always too numerous to be governed by all its members. Necessarily, public funds pass through the hands of the chiefs, who, beyond the interest of the state, all have their private interest, which is not the last one heard. The people on its side, perceiving the greed of the chiefs with their extravagant expenditures rather than for public needs, murmurs at seeing itself deprived of necessities in order to contribute to the superfluities of others; and when once these maneuvers have embittered it to a certain point, the most honest administration could no longer be able to restore confidence. Then, if the contributions are voluntary, they produce nothing; if they are forced, they are illegitimate; and it is within this cruel alternative of either allowing the state to perish or attacking

the sacred right of ownership, which is its support, that the difficulty of a just and wise *economy* consists.

[46]* The first thing that the founder of a republic ought to do after the establishment of laws is to find sufficient capital for the maintenance of magistrates and other officers, and for all the public expenses. This capital is called *aerarium* or *public treasury* if it is in money; the *public domain* if it is in land, and this latter is preferable to the other, for reasons easy to see. Anyone who has reflected sufficiently on this matter will hardly be able to disagree with Bodin, who regarded the public domain as the most honest and the surest of all means for providing for the needs of the state; it is to be noted that the first concern of Romulus in the division of land was to set aside a third for this use. I acknowledge that it is not impossible for the product of this domain to be badly administered, and thus reduced to nothing; but it is not of the essence of the domain to be badly administered.

[47] Prior to all employment, this capital should be assigned or accepted by the assembly of the people or the estates of the country, which should then determine its use. After this solemnity, which renders these sums inalienable, they change their nature, so to say, and their revenues become so sacred that it is not only the most infamous of all thefts but a crime of high treason to divert the least of them to the detriment of their destined purpose. It is a great dishonor for Rome that the integrity of the Quaestor Cato was even questioned, and that an emperor, rewarding a singer's talents with a few coins, had to add that this money came from his family's goods and not from those of the state. But if few are found like Galba, where will we find Catos? and when once vice no longer dishonors, who among the chiefs will be scrupulous enough to abstain from touching public revenues left to their discretion, and not soon deceive themselves by pretending to confound their vain and scan-

dalous dissipations with the glory of the state, and the means of extending their authority with those of augmenting their power? It is above all in this delicate part of administration that virtue is the only effective instrument, and that the integrity of the magistrate is the only curb capable of containing his avarice. The books and all the accounts of managers serve less to disclose their infidelities than to cover them up; and prudence is never as prompt to imagine new precautions as knavery is to elude them. Leave the registers and papers aside then, and return finances to loyal hands; this is the only means by which they will be loyally managed.

[48] Once the public capital has been established, the chiefs of the state are by right its administrators; for this administration forms part of the government, always essential, though not always equally so: its influence increases in measure as those of the other parts diminish; and one can say that a government has reached its last degree of corruption when it has no other sinew than money; yet as every government tends unceasingly to slacken, this single reason shows why no state is able to subsist unless its revenues unceasingly increase.

[49] The first awareness of this increase is also the first sign of internal disorder in the state: the wise administrator, in seeking to find the money to provide for the present need, does not neglect to seek the remote cause of this new need; just as a sailor seeing water flood his vessel does not forget while starting the pumps to seek out and to close the leak.

[50] From this rule flows the most important maxim of the administration of finances, which is to work with much more care to prevent needs than to increase revenues; whatever diligence one can use, the help that comes only after the harm, and more slowly, always leaves the state worse off: while one tries to remedy a pitfall, another is already making itself felt, and the resources that are used themselves produce new pitfalls; so that in the end the nation is encum-

bered with debt, the people is ground down, the government loses all its vigor and does only little with much money. I believe that from this great well-established maxim flowed the wonders of ancient governments, which did more with their parsimony than ours do with their treasuries; and it is perhaps from this that the common conception of the word *economy* derives, which means the wise management of what one has more than ways of acquiring what one does not have.

[51]* Independent of the public domain, which yields to the state in proportion to the probity of those who regulate it, if the full force of general administration is sufficiently understood, especially when confined to legitimate means, one would be astounded at the resources the chiefs have to anticipate all the public needs without touching the goods of individuals. As they are the masters of all the state's commerce, nothing is so easy for them as to direct it in a manner which provides for everything, often without their seeming to be involved. The distribution of commodities, of money, and of merchandise in just proportions, according to the time and the place, is the true secret of finance, and the source of its riches, provided that those who administer it know how to have enough foresight, and to take an occasional apparent and current loss in order to have really immense profits in the long run. When one sees a government paying duties instead of receiving them, for the export of grain in abundant years and for its importation in years of scarcity, one needs to have such facts before one's eyes in order to believe them true, and if they had occurred long ago one would place them in the rank of fiction. Suppose that to prevent scarcity in bad years one proposed to establish public granaries: in how many countries would the maintenance of such a useful establishment not serve as a pretext for new taxes? In Geneva these granaries, established and maintained by a wise administration, serve as the public resource in bad years and the principal revenue of the

state at all times; *Alit et ditat* ["It nourishes and enriches"] is the proper and just inscription one reads on the facade of the building. In order to explain here the economic system of a good government, I have often turned my eyes to that of this republic: happy to thus find in my fatherland the example of the wisdom and happiness which I would wish to see reign in every country.

[52] If one examines how the needs of a state grow, one will find it often happens somewhat as among individuals, less by true necessity than by an increase of useless desires, and often one only increases one's expenses merely to have a pretext for increasing receipts; so the state would sometimes gain from not being rich, as this apparent wealth is fundamentally more onerous than would be poverty itself. One can hope, it is true, to hold the people in a tighter dependency, by giving them with one hand what is taken from them with the other, and this was the policy Joseph used with the Egyptians; but this vain sophism is all the more deadly to the state, as the money is not returned to the same hands from which it came, and with such maxims one only enriches the idle from the spoils of useful men.

[53]* The relish for conquest is one of the most obvious and dangerous causes of this increase. This relish, often engendered by a kind of ambition different from the one it seems to announce, is not always what it seems to be, and its true motive is not so much the apparent desire to aggrandize the nation as the hidden desire to increase the authority of the chiefs at home, with the help of increased troops and by means of the diversion that war's objectives create in the minds of the citizens.

[54] What is at least very certain is that nothing is so ground down and miserable as conquering peoples, and that their successes themselves only augment their miseries: even if history did not teach us, reason would suffice to demonstrate to us that the greater the state is, the more its expenses become proportionately heavy and onerous; for it

is necessary that all provinces furnish their quotas to the expense of the general administration; and beyond this each province must incur its contingent and cover the same expense as if it were independent. Add to this that all fortunes are made in one place and spent in another; this breaks the equilibrium between what is produced and what is consumed, and impoverishes much of the countryside to enrich a single town.

[55] Another source of the increase of public needs is tied to the preceding one. A time may come when the citizens, no longer regarding themselves as interested in the common cause, cease to be defenders of the fatherland, and when the magistrates prefer to command mercenaries rather than free men, if only to use the former at any appropriate time and place in order to better subjugate the latter. Such was the state of Rome at the end of the republic and under the emperors; for all the victories of the first Romans, and even those of Alexander, had been won by brave citizens who knew how to give their blood for the fatherland when needed, but who never sold it. Marius was the first who, in the war against Jugurtha, dishonored the legions by introducing freedmen, vagabonds, and other mercenaries into them. Having become the enemies of the people, whom they had been charged to render happy, the tyrants established settled troops, in appearance to restrain foreigners, in fact to oppress the inhabitants. In order to form these troops, it became necessary to take farmers from the land; their absence diminished the quality of food and maintaining them introduced taxes, which increased prices. This first disorder made the people murmur; it became necessary to multiply the troops to repress them, consequently increasing the misery; and the more the despair increased, the more one was constrained to increase it again to prevent its effects. On the other hand, these mercenaries, who could be valued according to the price for which they sold themselves, proud of their debasement, despising the laws that protected them

and their brothers whose bread they ate, believed themselves to be more honored to be satellites of Caesar than the defenders of Rome; committed to a blind obedience, they had as their task to hold a dagger over their fellow citizens, ready to slaughter all at the first signal. It would not be difficult to show that this was one of the principal causes of the ruin of the Roman Empire.

[56] The invention of artillery and fortifications has forced the sovereigns of Europe in our day to reestablish the use of regular troops to defend their strongholds; but with more legitimate motives, it is to be feared that the effect will be equally disastrous. It will be no less necessary to depopulate the countryside to form armies and garrisons; in order to maintain them it will be no less necessary to bear down on the people; and these dangerous establishments have been growing for some time, with such rapidity in all our areas that one can only anticipate the approaching depopulation of Europe and sooner or later the ruin of the peoples that inhabit it.

[57] Be that as it may, one ought to see that such institutions necessarily upset the true economic system, which takes the principal revenue of the state from the public domain, and leaves only the vexatious resource of subsidies and taxes, of which it remains for me to speak.

[58]* It is necessary to remember here that the foundation of the social pact is ownership, and its first condition, that each should be sustained in the peaceful enjoyment of those things which belong to him. It is true that by the same treaty each obligates himself, at least tacitly, to be assessed for the public needs; but this engagement not being prejudicial to the fundamental law, and presuming the evidence of need recognized by the contributors; one sees that to be legitimate, this assessment should be voluntary: not from an individual will, as if it were necessary to have the consent of each citizen, who only gives what he pleases, for this would be directly counter to the spirit of the confederation;

but from a general will, a majority of votes, and by a proportional rate, which leaves nothing arbitrary to the imposition of taxes.

[59]* This truth, that taxes can be legitimately established only by the consent of the people or their representatives, has been generally recognized by all philosophers and jurists who have acquired some reputation in matters of political right, without excepting Bodin himself. If some few have set down maxims contrary in appearance, however easy it is to see the particular motives which moved them to do so, they have placed so many conditions and restrictions on them that fundamentally it comes out to be exactly the same: for whether the people can refuse or the sovereign should not demand is wholly indifferent as to what is right; and if it is only a question of force, it is useless to examine whether it is legitimate or not.

[60]* The contributions taken from the people are of two kinds: the one, property taxes, which are collected on things; the other, personal taxes, which are paid by the head. One gives to them the name of *taxes* or *subsidies:* when the people fixes the sum it gives, it is called a *subsidy;* when it concedes the full product of a levy, it is a *tax.* One finds in the book *The Spirit of the Laws* that assessment by head is more accordant with servitude, and that the property levy is more congenial to liberty. That would be incontestable if the shares by head were equal; for nothing would be more disproportionate than such a levy, and it is above all in exactly observed proportions that the spirit of liberty consists. But the head-levy is exactly proportioned to the means of private individuals, as the levy in France known as the *capitation* could be, and in that manner is simultaneously both a real-property and personal tax; it is the most equitable and consequently the most suitable to free men. These proportions seem at first very easy to observe, being relative to the status each man has in the world, because the indications are always public; but avarice, credit, and fraud know

how to elude even such evidence, and it is rare that one takes account in these calculations of all the elements which should be entered into them. First of all, one should consider the relation of quantities according to which, all things being equal, he who has ten times as many goods as another ought to pay ten times more than he. Second, the relation of usage, that is to say the distinction between what is necessary and what is superfluous, should be considered. He who has only bare necessities should have to pay nothing at all; the levy on one who has abundance can, if need be, go to the full extent of everything that exceeds what is necessary for him. To this he will say that with regard to his rank, what would be superfluous for an inferior is necessary for him; but this is a lie: for a Noble has two legs just like a cowherd, and like him he has only one belly. More important, this pretended necessity is so unnecessary to his rank that if he knew how to renounce it for a laudable reason, he would be the more respected for it. The people would prostrate itself before a minister who went to the council on foot because he had sold his carriages to supply a pressing need of the state. Finally, the law prescribes magnificence to no one, and seemliness is never a reason against right.

[61] A third relation that is never counted, and which should always be counted first, is that of the usefulness each derives from the social confederation, which strongly protects the immense possessions of the rich individual and hardly permits a poor man to enjoy the cottage he has constructed with his own hands. All the advantages of society, are they not for the powerful and the rich? all the lucrative positions, are they not filled by them alone? all the favors, all the exemptions, are they not reserved for them? and the public authority, is it not in their favor? Should an important man steal from his creditors or commit other knavery, is he not always assured of impunity? The thrashings he distributes, the violent acts he commits, even the murders and assassinations of which he renders himself

guilty, are these affairs not squelched in silence, and after six months no longer in question? Should this same man be robbed, the police go into action immediately, and woe to the innocents whom he suspects. Does he travel in a dangerous place? see the escorts with him; the axle of his carriage breaks? everyone rushes to his aid; is it noisy at his door? he says a word, and all is quiet; the crowd inconveniences him? he makes a sign, and all falls into place; a wagon driver is in his way? his people are ready to assault him; and fifty honest pedestrians going about their business would be crushed rather than let one idle scoundrel be delayed in his carriage. All these niceties do not cost him a penny; they are the right[7] of the rich man, and not the price of wealth. How different is the picture of the poor man! The more humanity owes him, the more society refuses him; all doors are closed to him, even when he has a right to have them open; and if he sometimes obtains justice, it is with more difficulty than another would obtain a pardon; if work duty[8] is to be done, a militia to be raised, it is to him that one gives the preference; he always bears burdens from which his rich neighbor can afford to get himself exempted; at the least accident that happens to him, everyone avoids him; if his poor wagon turns over, far from being helped by anyone, he is to be considered happy if he avoids affronts from the flippant servants of a young duke: in a word, all the gratuitous assistance he needs is denied to him precisely because he has nothing with which to pay for it; but I hold him to be a lost man if he has the misfortune to have an honest soul, an amiable daughter, and a powerful neighbor.

[62] Another point no less important to make is that the losses of the poor are much less reparable than those of the

7. The French word is *droit;* in this context it can be construed as "privilege."—ED.

8. The French term is *des corvées,* i.e., unremunerated labor required by statute, usually among peasants.—ED.

rich, and the difficulty of acquisition is always increased with need. One does nothing with nothing; this is true in business as in Physics: money is the seed of money, and the first coin is sometimes harder to gain than the second million. There is still more: all the poor man pays is forever lost to him, and remains in or returns to the hands of the rich; and as it is to those who take part in government, or are close to it, that sooner or later the proceeds of taxes soon pass, they have, even in paying their share, an obvious interest to increase them.

[63] Let us summarize in a few words the social pact of the two stations: *You have need of me, as I am rich and you are poor; let us then reach an agreement between us: I will permit you to have the honor of serving me, on condition that you give me the little you have, for the trouble I will take to command you.*

[64] If one combines all these points with care, one will find that in order to portion out taxes in an equitable and truly proportional manner, the imposition should not be made solely by reason of the goods of the contributors but by a ratio composed of the difference of their conditions and the superfluity of their goods. This very important and very difficult operation is made every day by multitudes of honest clerks who know arithmetic, but which the Platos and the Montesquieus would not have dared to do without trembling and imploring heaven for enlightenment and integrity.

[65] Another disadvantage of personal taxation is that it makes itself felt too drastically and is levied with too much harshness; this does not prevent it from being subject to many bad debts, because it is much easier to conceal one's role and one's head from prosecution than one's possessions.

[66] Of all the other assessments, the quitrent on the land or the real estate tax has always been accepted as the most advantageous in the country where one has more regard for the quantity of the product and the surety of recovery [of

investment] than for the least infirmity of the people. Some have even dared to say that it is necessary to burden the peasant in order to rouse him from his idleness, and that he would do nothing if he had nothing to pay. But experience among all the peoples of the world disproves this ridiculous maxim: it is in Holland and England, where the farmer pays very little, and especially in China, where he pays nothing, that the land is best cultivated. On the contrary, wherever the laborer is assessed in proportion to the product of his field, he lets it lie fallow, or only reaps exactly what he needs to live. For anyone who loses the fruit of his effort, it is a gain to do nothing; and to place a fine on work is a singularly strange way of banishing idleness.

[67] The tax levy on land or grain, especially when excessive, results in two consequences so terrible that they would eventually depopulate and ruin every country where it is established.

[68] The first comes from the lack of circulation of currency, for commerce and industry attract all money from the countryside to the capitals: as the tax destroys the proportion which can still be found between the needs of the farmer and the price of his grain, money always comes and never returns; the richer the town, the more miserable the country. The proceeds of real estate taxes pass from the hands of the prince or the financier into those of artisans and merchants; and the farmer, who never receives more than the smallest part, is finally exhausted by always paying the same amount and always receiving less. How would a man be able to live if he had only veins and no arteries, or if the arteries carried blood only four inches from his heart? Chardin says that in Persia the rights of the king to commodities were also paid in commodities; this practice, which Herodotus tells us prevailed long ago in that country until the time of Darius, is able to prevent the harm of which I will speak. But unless the Persian stewards, directors, clerks, and warehousemen were a different species of people than every-

where else, I have a difficulty in believing that the least part of all these products reached the king, that the grain did not spoil in all the granaries, and that fire did not consume most of the warehouses.

[69] The second inconvenience comes from an apparent advantage, which allows mischief to aggravate before it is perceived. Grain is a commodity whose price is not raised by taxes in the country that produces it, and despite its absolute necessity, the quantity diminishes without an increase of price; this means that many people die of hunger although the grain continues to be inexpensive, and the laborer alone bears the cost of the tax he is unable to pass along in the price of the sale. We must recognize that one should not reason in the same way concerning the real estate tax as about duties on all merchandise on which the price is raised by taxes so that they are paid less by merchants than by the buyers. For these duties,[9] however high they may be, are still voluntary, and are paid by the merchant only in proportion to the merchandise he buys; and as he buys only in relation to his market, he applies the law to the individual case. But the laborer who, whether he sells or not, is constrained to pay in fixed terms for the land he cultivates, is he not the master to wait on receiving for this produce the price that he asks? and when he does not sell it to feed himself, he still would be forced to sell it to pay the quitrent tax, hence it is often the enormity of the tax that keeps the commodity at a cheap price.

[70] Notice again that the resources of commerce and industry, far from rendering the land tax more bearable through an abundance of money, only renders it more onerous. I will not insist on a perfectly obvious fact, that while the greater or lesser quantity of money in a state may give it more or less credit abroad, it in no way changes the real

9. The French word is *droits,* which in this context means "import duties."—ED.

fortune of the citizens, and has no bearing on their material comfort. I will make two important remarks: one is that unless the state has excess produce, and a large supply of money comes from foreign sales, only the towns engaged in this business profit from this abundance, and only the peasant becomes relatively poorer; the other point: as the price of all things rises with the multiplication of money, taxes also have to rise in proportion, and the laborer consequently finds himself more heavily burdened without having more resources.

[71] One should see that the land tax is truly a tax on its products. However, everyone agrees that nothing is so dangerous as a tax on grain paid by the buyer: is it not clear that this evil is a hundred times worse when this tax is paid by the farmer himself? Is this not to attack the subsistence of the state at its source? Does it not also work directly to depopulate the country and consequently to ruin it in the long run? for there is no worse scarcity for a country than that of men.

[72] In deciding about the tax base, only a true statesman is capable of raising his sights beyond the object of finances [income], to transform these onerous charges into useful adjustments of policy, and so make the people wonder whether such practices do not have the nation's good as their end rather than the mere production of tax income.

[73]* Duties on the importation of foreign merchandise which the inhabitants are eager to have but for which the country has no need, on the exportation of those products of the land[10] of which the country has no excess but which foreigners cannot do without, on the productions of useless and too lucrative arts, on the entry into the towns of things that are purely embellishments, and in general on all luxurious things, will fulfill this double purpose. It is by such taxes, which allay poverty and charge wealth, that it is necessary

10. The French word is *cru*, i.e., production of vineyards, especially. —ED.

to prevent the continual augmentation of the inequality of fortunes, the subjection to the rich of a multitude of workers and useless servants, the multiplication of idle people in the towns, and the desertion of the countryside.

[74] It is important to place between the price of things and the duties charged on them such a proportion that the greediness of individuals shall not reach fraud by the immensity of profits. It is also necessary to prevent the ease of contraband, by preferring merchandise less easy to hide. Finally, it is appropriate that the tax be paid by the one who uses the taxed article, rather than by him who sells it, who, because of the quantity of duties charged him, would have more temptations and means to defraud. This is the regular practice in China, the country where taxes are the heaviest and best paid in the world: the merchant pays nothing; the purchaser alone pays the duty, with it resulting in neither murmurs nor sedition; because the commodities necessary to life, such as rice and grain, being absolutely exempt, the people are not pressed, and the tax falls only on those comfortably situated. Moreover, all these precautions should be dictated not so much by fear of contraband as by the attention that the government ought to have to secure private individuals against the seduction of illegitimate profits, which, after having made them bad citizens, would soon make them into dishonest people.

[75] Let heavy levies be established on livery for servants, on carriages, mirrors, chandeliers, and suites of furniture, on cloth and gilding, on the courtyards and gardens of mansions, on theater performances of all kinds, on the idle professions, such as comedians, singers, actors, and, in a word, on the multitude of objects of luxury, diversion, and idleness, which strike all eyes and which can scarcely be hidden, as their sole use is to be displayed and would be without utility if not seen. One need not fear that the proceeds from such taxes would be arbitrary, for they would be on things that are not of absolute necessity; it is to not know

men well to believe that once being seduced by luxury they will never be able to renounce it; they would rather renounce necessities a hundred times and would much prefer to die from hunger than from shame. Increasing this expense will only be a new reason to sustain it, when the vanity of showing oneself as opulent will create its benefit from the price of the thing and the expense of the tax. As long as there will be rich men, they will want to distinguish themselves from the poor, and the state could not form a source of revenue less onerous or more assured than one based on this distinction.

[76] For the same reason, industry would suffer nothing from an economic order that would enrich the Public Finances, revive Agriculture, by relieving the laborer, and imperceptibly bring all fortunes to that moderate condition which is the true strength of a state. It could be, I admit, that these taxes would contribute to making some fashions disappear more rapidly; but this would never occur without substituting for them others by which the worker would profit, without anything being lost to the public treasury. In a word, let us suppose that the spirit of the government should constantly assess all taxes on the superfluous possessions of the rich; one of two things would transpire: either the rich will renounce their superfluous expenses in order to make only useful expenditures, which would return to the profit of the state; then the assessment of taxes would produce the effect of the best sumptuary laws; the outlays of the state would necessarily diminish with those of private individuals; and the public treasury will be more efficient in its receipts, as it would have much less to disburse: or if the rich diminish none of their thriftlessness, the public treasury will have in the proceeds from taxes the resources it seeks in order to be able to meet the real needs of the state. In the first case, the public treasury is enriched by the reduction in expenditures it has to make; in the second, it is still enriched, by the useless expenditures of private individuals.

[77] Let us add to all this an important distinction in matters of political right, to which governments, jealous to do everything themselves, ought to give close attention. I have said that personal tax levies and taxes on absolutely necessary things, by attacking directly the right of ownership, and consequently the true foundation of political society, are always subject to dangerous consequences, if they are not established with the express consent of the people or their representatives. It is not the same with duties on things that one can forbid oneself to use; for then, as the private individual is not being absolutely constrained to pay, his contribution can be viewed as voluntary; so that the individual consent of each of the contributors supplants the general consent and even presupposes it in some way: for why would the people be opposed to a tax that only falls upon whoever wants to pay it? It seems certain to me that anything not forbidden by the laws or contrary to moral customs, and which the government is able to prohibit, can be permitted, providing a duty is paid. If, for example, the government is able to forbid the use of carriages, it can with more reason impose a levy on carriages, a wise and useful way of disapproving their use without ending it. Then one can regard the levy as a form of reparation whose proceeds compensate for the abuse it punishes.

[78]* Someone could object perhaps that those whom Bodin calls *impostors,* that is to say those who impose or invent taxes, being in the class of the rich, will be mindful to spare others at their own expense, not to burden themselves to relieve the poor. But such ideas must be rejected. If in each nation those to whom the sovereign commits the governance of the peoples were by this very condition their enemies, there would be no point in seeking what they [the chiefs] ought to do to render them [the peoples] happy.

Notes to *Discourse on Political Economy**

[1] This essay, originally published as an article in Diderot's *Encyclopédie,* vol. V, which appeared in the fall of 1755, a year after the Second Discourse, may perhaps indicate Rousseau's shift of focus from speculative history to concern with present-day problems; in any event, it clearly prefigures and helps to clarify, in terms of application, the orientation more fully worked out on a more theoretical level in *Of the Social Contract,* the first edition of which appeared in 1762, twelve years later. In contrast to the latter, the focus here is on governmental administration of laws, not on the principle of sovereignty; but it is significant that it was in this article, oriented to practical problems of justifiable administration, that Rousseau first uses the term "the general will" and first makes the distinction between "government" and "sovereignty" (cf. SC 150–53). Thus the fundamental conceptual structure worked out in *Of the Social Contract* was already present in Rousseau's thinking, and is given first expression in terms of governmental function.[1]

FATHER OF THE FAMILY: A reference to another article in the *Encyclopédie.* For Rousseau's own views on "domestic economy," one might refer to his novel *Julie, or the New Heloise.*

[2–6] Compare this extended discussion of the family structure with SC 9.

*All unidentified references are to paragraph numbers in this essay; when preceded by "SC," to paragraph numbers in *Of the Social Contract;* when preceded by "E" to page numbers in *Emile;* references to other works cited are to chapter numbers, paragraphs (Par.), or pages (p).

[1] "Political Economy," which was a standard term until quite recently, was defined by Adam Smith as "The act of managing the resources of a people and of its government." See *Oxford Universal Dictionary,* ed. Little et al. (Oxford University Press, 1933, 1955), p. 582, col. 3.

[7] **two illustrious men:** I.e., John Locke, in his *First Treatise on Civil Government,* and Algernon Sidney, in *Discourse Concerning Government.*

[8] **See POLITICS and SOVEREIGNTY:** Insofar as the *Encyclopédie* was not completed until 1761, it is not clear from this note whether Rousseau is merely extending the courtesy of cross-referencing anticipated articles or whether he has indeed read the manuscripts and wishes to endorse them.

[10–11] This comparison of the political to the individual body voices an old theme, in Western thought since Plato, and is used by most thinkers espousing some version of an organic theory of society (see Introduction).

[12] **general will:** Rousseau's first published use of this term, which is one central strand in *Of the Social Contract;* the definition which follows is more explicit than any in the later essay and illuminates his use of the phrase there, especially in passages such as SC 75ff.

See the word RIGHT: A reference to an article by Diderot under the heading "Natural Right," in which the distinction between "general" and "individual" will is made and it is asserted that the "general will is always good"; Rousseau acknowledges indebtedness to Diderot for his crucial term (which Diderot used in a way accordant with the tradition of natural law theory); but Rousseau radically revised its meaning in adapting it; see the definition in this paragraph and compare it with his first use of it in *Of the Social Contract,* SC 45.

[14] **good or bad government . . . morality:** It is to be noted that the standard of judgment for both are the same.

[15] **Every political society is composed of . . . smaller societies:** Despite the reluctant acceptance of political pluralism in SC 78 (cf. SC 66), notice not only its explicit acceptance here as a fact of life but that its meaning is accordant with the priority of the communal interest over the interests of subordinate groupings.

[16] **when the people are seduced:** Note the warning against the danger of demagoguery.

the public decision . . . another: Cf. use of this phrase in SC 76.

the general will is always for the common good: Cf. SC 66, 75.

Note the distinction between the will of private individuals or groups and the general will, enunciated by the distinction in SC 76 between "the will of all and the general will."

[17] **the public faith:** I.e., "civil religion" (cf. SC 439–41).

[19] **at the same time . . . the government:** Note the dual task of

a free society; cf. SC 55–57, which gives this entire paragraph a philosophic foundation.

[20] Cf. SC 96–106.

[23] **the legislator:** Cf. SC 105–16; also SC 118–34, 230–44.

[25] **that virtue reigns:** The word *virtue* is used frequently in both essays, but it does not seem to have been explicitly defined in either. It would, however, seem that what is generally meant by it, beyond the traditional individual virtues of honesty, courage, etc., is the habitual placing of the interests of the common good ahead of one's own (cf., e.g., 28–31).

[29] Rousseau is here, and in the following paragraphs, voicing a tradition, extending from Plato to Dewey, that one prime function of a responsible social order is the education of its citizens (cf. esp. 37–39).

[32] **the commitment of the body of the nation:** The principle of the reciprocity of rights and duties entails an obligation of the community to its members just as its members are obligated to the community.

sacrifice an innocent man: Participation by each citizen in the general will and the social contract endows him with a rightful claim to be protected by the power of the community; cf. 33; SC 40, 42, 47, 50. (It should be clear that charges of Rousseau's "totalitarianism" collapse in the face of this emphasis on the import of *each* individual citizen.)

[34] **the common liberty:** The preservation of which is the proper function of law.

most difficult in government: The unity of a society requires that it not be divided into two warring classes. Note here and in the balance of this essay the development of the thesis that government should properly play an economic role by fostering a middle-class society in which "all have something, and none of them has too much" (SC 65n.). (Cf. Introduction.)

[36–39] **citizens:** Note the import of citizenship and its full meaning being developed (cf. SC 46).

[37] **the education of their children:** These paragraphs are indeed prophetic—for it is only with increasing democratization that universal public education has come to be recognized as a crucial responsibility of organized society. Rousseau was one of the very first to insist that education is a prime legitimate claim of the individual citizen on his society, a completely unknown and largely inconceivable idea in his

time. Note that one prime function of such public education is development of **the courage and virtue of citizens** (see 38).

[41] This whole third section can be read as amplifying what has already been indicated in 34.

[42] **the right of . . . ownership:** Note that although private property is held to be something of a public trust (cf. SC 63), Rousseau regards private ownership essential to the health of a free society; his reasons should be noted. (See 42 n.6, 58, 77; Introduction.)

[46] Cf. SC 106ff.

[51] It would seem that what is being advocated is the role of government as a general overseer of the private economy while taking care to anticipate public emergencies and public needs; in this regard Rousseau was opposed to the Physiocrats of his time, who advocated full free trade. In a way, Rousseau's position is perhaps somewhat akin to the more traditional notion of mercantilism. (In reading these paragraphs, it is important to remember that Rousseau is thinking in terms of a preindustrial economy, and that he has been criticized for having no conception of the social benefit arising from the growth of private capital, which can be used for economic advances benefiting the society as a whole by producing new wealth for it.)

[53] **The relish for conquest . . . the chiefs at home:** One of the oldest reasons for aggressive war.

[58] **voluntary . . . from a general will:** I.e., taxation must be by general popular consent.

by a proportional rate: As spelled out further in 60 and 64, Rousseau is again being prophetic by advocating a tax system geared to the economic means of each individual; in a way, this can be seen as a forerunner of the idea of a "progressive" income tax system.

[59] **by the consent of the people or their representatives:** Here, and again in 77, "representatives" are given authority for the administration of the functions of government (apparently including the statutory legislation needed for tax laws); cf. SC 201 and comment suggesting that Rousseau's favored form of actual government is what he terms "elective aristocracy." But cf. SC 280–85.

[60] **assessment by head . . . property levy:** In accord with his principle that the rate of taxation should be in proportion to the ability to contribute to the public treasury, he is opposing a head tax (sometimes called a poll tax) in which each is assessed the same amount.

[73] In addition to proportionate taxation, he is also suggesting the

use of luxury taxes, i.e., a sales tax (see 74, 77) on luxury items. Note one important use of them aside from raising revenue: **to prevent the continual augmentation of the inequality of fortunes,** in accord with the principle of moderating the extremes of poverty and wealth (see SC 65n).

[78] The last sentence seems to equivocate deliberately between the way the word *sovereignty* was generally used in the eighteenth century —as the power of the ruler(s)—and the new use Rousseau is beginning to develop here (and only finally worked out in *Of the Social Contract*) —as the legitimate right of the people to ordain their own free government: for, it asks, if the ministers of the rulers are truly the enemies of the people and yet accepted as such, why bother about what is right or wrong, about what ought to be? In considering this question, it is well to remember that *On Political Economy* was written at about the same time as the Second Discourse, several years before the preliminary suggestion they both present was worked out quite explicitly in *Of the Social Contract;* indeed, this essay is the first time this new conception of "sovereignty," which Rousseau was to develop more fully in the later work, received any explicit development, and it must be then read as a preliminary statement. (Cf. 291 n.16.)

Biographical References

JEAN LE ROND D'ALEMBERT, (1717–1783): French philosopher and mathematician, and a member of the French Academy, to whom Rousseau addressed his *Letter on the Theater,* on the general relation of politics and the arts. *SC 46n.*

ALEXANDER (356–323 B.C.): Student of Aristotle; legendary leader who took Greek armies to conquer Egypt and the Middle East, diffusing Greek culture to the Indus River. *PE 33.*

ARCHIMEDES (c. 287–212 B.C.): Famed Greek scientist. *SC 210.*

M. D'A (Marquis Marc Pierre d'Argenson) (1696–1764): French minister of foreign affairs 1744–1747. Rousseau's citations are from a privately circulated manuscript which was entitled *Treatise on the Admission of Democracy in a Monarchical State, or Considerations on the Ancient and Present Government of France.* Rousseau, in his first edition, cited the author only by initial; the posthumous edition of 1782, based on Rousseau's notes, spelled out the full name. *SC 10n., 76n., 137n., 439n.*

ARISTOTLE (384–322 B.C.): Student of Plato; the Greek philosopher generally credited with bringing together the sum of classical Greek learning. His *Politics* is generally taken as a systematic defense of a free constitutional structure (which he termed "polity"); in it, he nevertheless restricted participation to free citizens, while defending the institution of slavery (I, 4–7). *SC 13, 14, 207, 257n.; PE 7.*

PIERRE BAYLE (1647–1706): Leading controversial thinker of his time; one of the first to defend the principle of religious toleration (along with Locke), and to argue for the autonomy of morality from theology (anticipating Kant). A French Calvinist, he fled, during the persecution of the Huguenots, to Rotterdam, where he edited one of the foremost intellectual journals of his time, *Nouvelles de la République des Lettres. SC 422.*

JEAN BODIN (1530–1596): French political writer who advocated religious toleration, advanced economic thought, maintained that property and family are the bases of society, and that rebellion against the reigning monarch is never justifiable. *SC 46n.; PE 46, 59, 78.*

JULIUS CAESAR (100–44 B.C.): Roman general, regarded as having destroyed the Roman Republic by becoming Rome's first emperor. *SC 251n., 440n; PE 30.*

CALIGULA (A.D. 12–41): Roman emperor known for his cruel and tyrannical reign; probably insane, he had himself declared a god just before his assassination. *SC 12, 13, 107.*

JEAN CALVIN (1509–1564): A prime leader of the Protestant Reformation, author of the *Institutes of the Christian Religion.* Born in France, he moved to Geneva in 1538 and dominated its life from 1541 until his death. Although his theology called for theocratic government, his followers were leading proponents of religious toleration and political reform. *SC 110n.*

CATO THE YOUNGER (95–46 B.C.): Roman Stoic who, as tribune, denounced Caesar as an accomplice of Catiline; after hearing of Caesar's victory in 48 B.C., he committed suicide. *SC 29n.; PE 30.*

MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO (106–43 B.C.): Roman statesman and philosopher, whose *On the Republic* is an important contribution to the development of the democratic tradition. Killed by soldiers of Mark Antony and his allies for opposing their claim to succession after Caesar's death; Rousseau cites two of his books, *Of the Duties of Office* and *Of the Laws. SC 378.*

OLIVER CROMWELL (1599–1658): Lord Protector of England, 1653–1658; presumably, Rousseau's displeasure stems from Cromwell's dissolution of the "Rump Parliament" in 1653 by military force. *SC 317, 434.*

RENÉ DESCARTES (1596–1650): French mathematician, scientist, and philosopher, whose *Discourse on Method* and *Meditations on First Philosophy* are generally regarded as the beginning of modern philosophy. *SC 126.*

SIR ROBERT FILMER (c.1590–1653): English writer who strongly supported the doctrine of the divine right of kings in several works, including *Patriarcha,* which Rousseau cites. *PE 7.*

GEORGE I (1660–1727): Duke of Hanover (and Leibniz's sponsor), who became the first Hanoverian king of England, in 1714. *SC 74.*

HUGO GROTIUS (1583–1645): Dutch jurist and statesman, generally

considered one of the fathers of international law. *SC 10, 11, 21, 26, 30, 35, 74, 314, 421n.*

HENRY IV (1553–1610): King of Navarre and France, he converted to Catholicism from Calvinism in order to secure recognition as the French king. *SC 443.*

THOMAS HOBBES (1588–1679): English philosopher who espoused belief in a "state of nature" as savage anarchy with constant warfare of "each against all"; in his *Leviathan* he argued that the first necessity is domestic peace, that this necessitates a social contract whereby all individuals accept an absolute ruler, who rightfully receives complete obedience from his subjects in return for maintaining the peace. (See Rousseau on Hobbes, E 458.) *SC 11, 13, 421.*

JAMES II (1633–1701): Successor to Charles II; king of England 1658–1688, when he escaped to France during the Glorious Revolution. *SC 74.*

LOUIS XIII (1215–1270): Became king of France in 1226 and was canonized as Saint Louis in 1297. *SC 74.*

LYCURGUS (c.8th century B.C.): Traditionally regarded as the "Legislator" of the constitution of Sparta. *SC 78, 106n., 110, 120.*

NICCOLÒ MACHIAVELLI (1469–1527): Italian statesman and writer, author of *The Prince,* which outlines techniques for the seizure of political power, and *Discourses on the First Ten Books of Livy,* which sought to establish on an empirical basis the political conditions and practices requisite for political liberty. Often regarded as a father of modern political science as well as one of the first proponents of the nation-state and of modern democratic theory. *SC 78n., 116n., 212, 248n., 251n.; PE 18.*

CHARLES DE SECONDAT, BARON DE LA BRÈDE ET DE MONTESQUIEU (1689–1755): Author of a seminal work (with a direct impact on the writing of the American Constitution). Despite some criticisms, Rousseau had a high regard for him and considered his book as a key to the science of legislation. *SC 107, 137, 195, 230, 334; PE 64.*

NUMA: Mythological successor to Romulus and the originator of many Roman laws. For reasons stated in his *Government of Poland,* II, Rousseau regarded Numa, not Romulus, as the true founder of Rome. *SC 78, 343n.*

PETER THE GREAT (1672–1725): Generally regarded as the founder of the Russian Empire, he established Saint Petersburg (later to become Petrograd and then Leningrad) as Russia's Baltic "window to the

West." Rousseau's criticism of Peter's reign is in marked contrast to the general approbation expressed by Voltaire and other French Enlightenment *philosophes. SC 122*

PHILO (2nd Cent. B.C.): Jewish philosopher from Alexandria, who had a great influence on the development of medieval Platonism. *SC 12.*

PLATO (c.427–347 B.C.): Foremost Greek philosopher. The concept of "mixed government" was developed in his *Laws,* and the latter part of the *Crito* can be read as suggesting Rousseau's notion of the social contract. *SC 107, 118, 222; PE 21, 64.*

PLUTARCH (c.A.D. 46–120): Greek writer best known for his *Lives* of prominent Greeks and Romans. *SC 14n.*

SAMUEL FREIHERR VON PUFFENDORF (1632–1694): Author of *Elements of Universal Jurisprudence,* he was a German writer on international law, following Grotius. *PE 43.*

FRANÇOIS RABELAIS (c.1494–1553): Famous French satirist. *SC 21.*

ABBÉ DE SAINT-PIERRE (1658–1743): French writer who published *Project for Perpetual Peace* in 1713; in 1760, Rousseau wrote a commentary on this pamphlet and then his own *Project for Perpetual Peace. SC 341.*

TULLIUS SERVIUS (578–534 B.C.): Roman statesman who reorganized the Roman class structure and who was finally assassinated. *SC 78, 347, 349, 356, 357, 358, 368.*

SOCRATES (c.469–399 B.C.): Athenian philosopher who was Plato's teacher and celebrated as the leading figure in the Platonic Dialogues. *PE 30.*

SOLON (c.639–599 B.C.): Described by Aristotle as a "moderate democrat," he is regarded as having initiated the Athenian democratic development. *SC 78.*

TACITUS (A.D. c.55–117): Famed Roman historian. *SC 219n., 324.*

WILLIAM WARBURTON (1698–1779): English historian and churchman, bishop of Gloucester, author of *Alliance Between Church and State.* A friend of Alexander Pope, he was a vigorous opponent of the Enlightenment, as represented by David Hume, Voltaire, and the Deists generally. *SC 117, 422.*

WILLIAM OF ORANGE (1650–1702): Became William II, king of England, Scotland and Ireland, in 1689, by Act of Parliament after the Glorious Revolution *SC 74.*